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NO-FAULT IN THE COURTS:
A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
The current methods of compensating victims of automobile
accidents are in need of reform. However, there is a wide diver-
gence of opinion as to how this reform should be accomplished. No-
fault automobile insurance is the proposal which has received the
greatest amount of public attention in recent years, and North
Dakota, like many other states, is now considering some form of
no-fault automobile insurance."
Though most debate has centered on the merits of particular
no-fault plans 2 a more basic question is whether the concept of no-
fault insurance comports with the requirements imposed by both the
federal and state constitutions. The significance of the constitutional
issues involved in no-fault is pointed out by recent case law. In the
three state supreme court cases testing the constitutionality of no-
fault statutes, two such statutes have been found constitutionally de-
ficient.2 This note will examine the judicial treatment of the no-
fault statutes and will attempt to analyze the constitutional pitfalls
that have been revealed by the state supreme court cases.
II. WHAT IS NO-FAULT?
The concept of compensation for the victims of automobile ac-
1. A resolution was introduced in the North Dakota Senate in 1971 calling for a study
of no-fault automobile insurance. The North Dakota Legislative Council, after study and
consultation, made its recommendation of a modified no-fault plan which provided certain
first party benefits, contained some limitation on pain and suffering damages, and retained
the tort remedy. Senate Bill 2031, based on the recommended plan, was indefinitely post-
poned in the 1973 legislative session.
2. See, e.g., Harvin, Ghlardi, Curtis, Responsible Reform or the "No-fault" Syndrome: a
Panel, 21 FEDERATION INs. CoUN. Q. 9 (1970-1971); Kircher, Ghiardi, U.M.Y.A.R.A. is not
the Answer, 59 A.B.A. J. 483 (1973) ; 44 Miss. L.J. (1973) (Symposium on no-fault).
3. The Massachusetts personal injury protection plan was upheld in Pinnick v. Cleary,
271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971). The Illinois plan was declared unconstitutional in Grace v.
Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972). The Florida property protection plan was
declared unconstitutional in Kluger v. White, Case No. 42,799 (Fla., filed July 11, 1973).
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cidents without regard to fault is not a new idea.4 In recent years,
however, it has become an increasingly popular subject for discus-
sion.' There are those who maintain that the present fault system
of compensation for automobile accident victims is inadequate, in-
efficient, and inequitable.6 These critics gained documentation for
their views when the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) re-
leased its two year 1.6 million dollar Automobile Insurance and
Compensation Study.7 According to Richard J. Barber, former Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Policy, the study re-
vealed "a system that is working very poorly and very inadequately.
It is indeed startling and terribly disturbing from both an economic
and human standpoint."" The DOT study documented that under
the present fault system, not only is auto liability insurance fail-
ing to pay most of the compensable loss suffered, 9 but what it
does pay is misallocated. This misallocation perpetuates a system
in which small claimants are generally overpaid, and those with
large claims are under-compensated. 10 An extensive array of pub-
lications documents and discusses the shortcomings of the present
system,11 its delay, misallocation of funds, and inefficiency; no-
fault has emerged as an alternative, and according to its proponents,
a vast improvement.J
2
The term no-fault automobile insurance is subject to many in-
terpretations. Also, many diverse plans go by the label of "no-
fault." On the national level two proposalls have received consider-
able attention. The Hart-Magnuson BilP was introduced in the
United States Senate in 1971 and is presently under consideration by
4. See REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE To STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMFBmIE ACCIDENTS
TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES '(1932). The
idea gained momentum with the publication of J. O'CONNEL & R. KEETON, BASId PROTECTION
FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965).
5. See, e.g., Haring, The Profession After No-Fault: What Grist for the Mill, "44 N.Y.
STATE BAR J. 145 (1972); Mackoff, No-Fault and the Courts, 5 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. &
PROC. 276 (1972) ; 44 MISs. L.J. (1973) (Symposium on no-fault) ; Note, No-Fault Motor
Vehicle Insurance: A Constitutional Perspective, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 104 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Keeton and O'Connell, Basic Protection Automobile Insurance in CRISIS IN
CAR INSURANCE 40 (1968).
7. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY
(1970) [hereinafter cited as DOT Study].
8. N.Y. Times, .pril 29, 1970, at 81, col. 6.
9. The DOT Study showed that although compensable losses totaled $5.1 billion in ser-
ious injury and death cases, only $800 million or 15% was paid by automobile liability
insurance. DOT Study: ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIES at
154-56 (Table 15 FS).
10. The DOT Study revealed that 60% of those who suffered more than $10,000 In meas-
urable economic loss received nothing in fault claims. 30% of that number received less than
50% of their measurable economic loss. In contrast, none of the victims with measurable
economic losses of less than $1,000 received less than half their losses, 87% got more than
their loss, and 14% got four times their loss or more. DOT Study: ECONOMIC CONSE-
QUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIES at 238 (Table 25 FS).
11. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY (1971); A. CONRAD, J. MOaaAN, R.
PRAT
r
, C. VOLTZ, R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS (1964).
12. See, e.g., Keeton, The Case for No-Fault Insurance, 44 Miss. L.J. 1 (1973).
13. S. 945, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). For discussion see Magnuson, Nationwide No-
Fault, 44 MIss L.J. 132 (1973).
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the Senate Judiciary Committee. There is also a uniform no-fault
law, the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparation Act (UM-
VARA) ,14 which was approved by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in August of 1972. The wide variance in the substance
of each plan reveals the diversity of opinion concerning what no-
fault automobile insurance is or should be. In addition to the dif-
ferences among the national plans, there is also considerable var-
iance among the state plans. To date, 12 states and Puerto Rico
have adopted some form of automobile reparations reform legisla-
tion. All of these reform measures differ in some respects. 5
Generally, no-fault insurance encompasses a form of first party
insurance under which the traffic accident victim recovers from his
own insurer without regard to questions of negligence and fault.
This concept seems relatively simple, but a number of issues re-
garding the implementation of this plan have not been resolved.
These include: (1) whether the coverage should be mandatory; (2)
what limitations on recovery should exist; (3) whether tort liability
should be restricted; (4) whether there should be compensation for
pain and suffering; and (5) whether arbitration should be part of
the plan. These problems are subject to wide variety of responses."6
Since none of the national plans has been enacted, the question
of their constitutionality remains an academic exercise. However,
three of the state plans have been tested in state supreme courts;
two have been found unconstitutional."
III. THE MASSACHUSETTS DECISION
The first constitutional test of no-fault came in 1971 in the Mass-
achusetts case of Pinnick v. Cleary."" In that case, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of that state's no-fault
personal injury protection statute (PIP).19 The statute provided for
payment of medical expenses, a portion of lost wages not otherwise
compensated, and actual expenditures for certain non-income pro-
ducing services performed by others in behalf of the injured person.
A $2,000 limitation was placed on the total amount a person could
collect. As a further limitation, injured persons could recover for
pain and suffering only if their medical expenses exceeded $500 or
14. For a discussion of this act see Ghiardi & Kircher, The Uniform Motor Vehicle Acci-,
dent Reparations Act: An Analysis and Critique, 40 INS. COUN. J. 87 (1973); Henderson.
The Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, 44 Miss. L.J. 107 (1973).
15. For a chart showing the characteristics of each state plan see 40 INS. COUN. J. 103-04,
App. B. (Jan. 1973).
16. Id.
17. Cases cited note 3 supra.
18. Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971).
19. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90 §§ 34A, D, M, N; ch. 175 §§ 22 E-11, 113 B-C; ch. 281
6 0D (Supp. 1973) [hereinafter cited as PIP Act] provided for no-fault automobile insur-
ance to cover bodily injuries. No-fault automobile property damage insurance was subse-
quently added in MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90 § 340 (Supp. 1972).
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if the accident (1) caused death; (2) involved a fracture or the loss
of a body member; (3) involved permanent and serious disfigure-
ment; or, (4) resulted in the loss of sight or hearing. The act also
provided for limited exemption from tort liability for the owner,
registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle having PIP
coverage to the extent that the injured party was eligible for PIP
benefits from his own insurer.
20
The facts of the Pinnick case were not in dispute. The plaintiff,
a motorist insured under PIP, was injured in an automobile accident
in Massachusetts that was caused by the negligence of the defend-
ant.2 1 The plaintiff, in his action for declaratory relief, claimed that
the Massachusetts no-fault automobile insurance law deprived him of
his constitutionally guaranteed right to full recovery in tort. The
court noted that in a common law tort action the plaintiff could
have recovered $1565: $115 for medical expenses, $650 for lost wages,
and $800 for pain and suffering. Under the new law, however, he
was entitled to recover his medical expenses, 75 percent of his lost
wages, and nothing for pain and suffering.
22
A. DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY RIGHT
Plaintiff's first argument to the Massachusetts Supreme Court
was that his remedy in tort constituted a vested property right, and
that the statute deprived him of that right. The court found this
argument unpersuasive:
[There is a] distinction between a cause of action which
has accrued and the expectation which every citizen has
if a legal wrong should occur to find redress according to
the rules of statutory and common law applicable at that
time.2
3
The court found ample authority for the proposition that "[n]o
person has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to in-
sist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit.
' 24
The court recognized the necessity of making changes in prior
law, and felt that the Massachusetts Constitution did not prohibit the
legislature from making these changes. The court noted the pro-
vision of the Massachusetts Constitution which provides for the con-
20. PIP Act ch. 90 § 34M (Supp.'1973). A tort action could be brought for any actual
losses not compensated by the PIP coverage. For a detailed analysis of the Massachusetts
statute see 7 BLASHFIED AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 275.5-.25 (3rd Ed. 1973 Supp.) ;
Kenney & McCarthy, "No-Fault" in Massachusetts, Chapter 670, Acts of 1970, A S nopab
and Analysis, 55 MAss. L.Q. 23 (1970).
21. Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 595 (Mass. 1971).
22. Id. at 596.
23. Id. at 599.
24. Id. citing New York Cent. RRI v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917).
tinuation in Massachusetts of the body of common law as amended
by statute prior to colonization.25 However, the court ruled that this
provision did not contemplate "freezing" all rules of law into the
system beyond repeal or revision.26 The court also asserted that the
section of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights which provides for
recourse in the law for all wrongs 27 was not a constitutional bar
to the no-fault plan. This provision, the court argued, protects only
the preservation of procedural rights. 2
The plaintiff attempted to persuade the court that a fundamental
right had been impaired by the no-fault statute, and therefore urged
the court to apply the "compelling state interest" test. The court,
however, could find no fundamental right involved and dismissed
plaintiff's contention that there was a constitutionally protected
"right of personal security and bodily integrity' 29 that had been im-
paired by the statute.2 0 This refusal to treat the legislature's al-
teration of the tort action for personal injuries any differently from
legislative alteration of other common law causes of action, enabled
the court to dispose quickly of the remainder of plantiff's argu-
ments based on the contrary premise.81
B. DUE PROCESS
The Massachusetts Supreme Court considered plaintiff's assertion
that the statute was a violation of the due process clause of the
14th Amendment.3 2 The court applied a two pronged test which in-
cluded the general test of whether the statute bore a reasonable
relation to a permissible legislative objective,2 and the more specific
25. MASS. CONST. pt. 11, c. 6, art. 6.
26. Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Mass. 1971) ; Holden v. Pioneer Bdcst. Co..
228 Or. 405, 411-12, 365 P.2d 845, 849-50 (1961).
27. MAss. CONST. pt. I, art. 11 provides:
Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by hav-
ing recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his
person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely, and
without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial:
promptly, and without delay; comformably to the laws.
28. Pinnick v. Clearly, 271 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Mass. 1971) ; see Cressey Y. Erie R.I., 278
Mass. 284, 291, 180 N.E. 160, 163 (1932); Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank,
Ltd., 281 Mass. 320, 184 N.E. 152 (1933); Commonwealth v. Hanley, 337 Mass. 384, 387,
149 N.E.2d 608, 610 (1958).
29. Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Mass. 1971). The court did not make clear
whether it recognized such a right. It held that, in any event, if the right asserted by the
plaintiff existed, it was not impaired by the statute.
30. The court found plaintiff's attempted analogy to the right to privacy as set out in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1956) to be inappropriate and without merit.
31. Pinnick v. Clearly, 271 N.E.2d 592, 600-01 (Mass. 1971). The court reasoned that
there was not reason for treating the legislative alteration of the tort action any differently
from alteration of any other pre-existing common law rule since the statute (1) did not
sweep broadly in the face of a less restrictive alternative; (2) did not discriminate against
interstate commerce; and (3) was not a total prohibition of a hitherto lawful activity.
32. Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 582, 601 (Mass. 1971) ; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1
states that: "[Nlor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .. "
33. Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 601 (Mass. 1971), citing West Coast Hotel Co. v.
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test of whether the legislature had provided an adequate substitute
for pre-existing rights.3 4 In subjecting the statute to the general
"rational relation" test, the court examined the abuses of the auto-
mobile accident recovery system including delay, congestion in the
courts, high insurance rates, inefficiency, and inequities suffered by
claimants. The court concluded that the solution enacted by the
legislature was a rational approach to the problem. In analyzing the
more specific question of whether the statute provided an adequate
sustitute for prior rights, the court relied on the anology to the
Workmen's Compensation cases.3 5 Just as the exchange of rights
that took place under Workmen's Compensation was deemed ade-
quate,36 the court found that the certainty, speed, and reduction in
expense of recovery under no-fault provided an adequate substitute
for pre-existing rights.
C. EQUAL PROTECTION
After disposing of plaintiff's general and specific" due process
objections, the court addressed itself to the equal protection38 issues
raised by the plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that the
classifications of those permitted to sue for pain and suffering
damages39 were arbitrary and capricious. The court applied the
"rational relationship" test, which asks whether the classification
created by the legislature bears a rational relationship to a permiss-
ible legislative objective. 40 The court reasoned that in view of the
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) ; Howes Bros. Co. v. Commn., 296 Mass. 275, 5 N.E.2d
720 (1936).
94. Id. at 605. This test is largely derived from New York Cent. R.i... v. White, 243 U.S.
188, 201 (1917).
The court reasoned that it did not have to reach the question of whether the legisla-
ture could, consistent with due process, abolish an existing right without providing a substi-
tute since In this case the statute merely altered the method of recovery. There is support
for the argument that pre-existing rights can be abolished on a policy basis. See Silver v.
Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929) (guest statute) ; Hanfgarn v. Mark, 274 N.Y. 22, 8 N.E.2d
47 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 641 (1937) (abolition of actions for breach of prom-
ise, seduction, alienation of affections, and criminal conversation).
35. Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 605-07 (Mass. 1971). New York Cent. R.R. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) is perhaps the leading case.
36. Cases cited note 35 supra.
37. Pnnik v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 607-09 (Mass. 1971). The court cited cases support-
ing its dismissal of plaintiff's contentions that plaintiff was denied due process (1) by
being forced to insure himself through a private corporation; (2) by having to pay fixed
insurance rates; and (3) by having compensation from a wage continuation plan deducted
from the amount he could recover under PIP.
38. Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 609 (Mass. 1971). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I
states that:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within Its Jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
39. The statute provided for a "threshold" of $500 in actual medical expenses which
must be incurred before a claimant could seek damages for pain and suffering, with the
exception tnat such damages could be sought regardless of medical expenses if the in-
jury caused fracture, death, loss of a body member, permanent and serious disfigurement,
or loss of sight or hearing. PIP Act ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1973).
40. Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 609 (Mass. 1971) ; see, e.g., Watson v. Maryland,
218 U.S. 173, 178 (1910) ; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) ; McDonald
v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
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"evils" produced by exaggerated pain and suffering claims and the
overpayment of minor "nuisance" claims, the classifications created
by the legislature were reasonably related to the correction of these
practices.
Plaintiff's second equal protection argument was that the $500
"threshold" invidiously discriminated against the poor. Plaintiff as-
serted that since medical care for the indigent is less expensive,
they would thus be less likely to qualify for pain and suffering
damages under the "threshold" approach than those who received
more expensive medical care. The court did not deal with this con-
tention, stating that plaintiff had failed to produce evidence in support
of this theory.
IV. THE ILLINOIS DECISION
The second constitutional test of no-fault produced the opposite
result from that obtained in Pinnick. The Illinois no-fault statute,
41
which was to go into effect January 1, 1972, was declared uncon-
stitutional by the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. This ruling
was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Grace
v. Howlett.42 Under the Illinois statute first party coverage was
mandatory for all drivers of private passenger automobiles if the
driver had chosen to purchase liability insurance. The coverage,
which extended to the insured, members of his family residing in the
household, occupants of his automobile, and pedestrians struck by
the insured vehicle, provided for prompt recovery of (1) medical
expenses; (2) 85 percent of lost income; and (3) expenditures made
for household help necessitated by injury to a non-employed member
of the household. Each category of coverage was restricted by man-
datory limits.4 3 Except in cases of death, dismemberment, perman-
ent disability or serious disfigurement, recovery of damages for
pain and suffering was limited to 50 percent of all medical expenses
under $500 and 100 percent of medical expenses over $500. The
Illinois plan also provided for arbitration of all claims of $3,000 or
less, with appeal permitted to the county courts in the form of
trials de novo."
41. ILL. STAT. §§ 1065.150 to -. 163 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973-74).
42. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972). The action was brought by
Michael J. Grace to enjoin Michael J. Howlett, Illinois auditor, and other state officials
from expending funds to enforce the no-fault statute.
43. ILL. STAT. § 1065.150 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973-74) ; (1) Medical expenses were lim-
ited to $2,000 per person for expenses incurred within one year of the accident.
(2) Income loss was limited to 85% of earnings, not to exceed $150 a week for 52 weeks.
(3) Reimbursement for household help was subject to a limitation of $12 a day for 365
days.
44. ILL. STAT. § 1065.159 provided that in counties with a population of 200,000 or more,
there should be arbitration of all claims arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle
where the amount in controversy was $3,000 or less. In counties with a population of less
than 200,000, arbitration extended to all motor vehicle accident cases. § 1065.159(g) pro-
vided for a trial de novo if a party wanted to dispute the finding of the arbitrators.
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The state circuit court found that the Illinois plan violated the
due process and equal protection clauses of the United State Con-
stitution and the Illinois Constitution. 4 5 Specifically, the circuit court
found that the provision of the law which made recovery of dam-
ages for pain and suffering dependent on the amount of actual medi-
cal expenses constituted invidious discrimination.46 The Supreme
Court of Illinois, while affirming the circuit court's decision, based its
decision on other grounds.
A. SPECIAL LAW PROHIBITION
First, the Supreme Court ruled that the Illinois plan, specifically
the section on general damages, was in violation of Article IV of
the Illinois Constitution. This article provides that:
"[t]he General Assembly shall pass no special or local law
where a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether
a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a
matter for judicial determination."
47
This provision overlaps with the Equal Protection Clause of the Il-
linois Constitution, 48 but provides for greater judicial responsibility
in determining whether a general law is applicable.49 The court
noted that first party coverage was mandatory for a certain class
only, private passenger vehicles, while the limitation on the right
to seek special damage applied to all claims arising out of any
motor vehicle accident. The classifications are more easily visual-
ized with the aid of an illustration used by the court: A and B are
pedestrians who either do not own cars or have not purchased in-
surance. A is struck by a vehicle which is included within the first
party coverage category. A then receives prompt payment of the
no-fault benefits. B, however, is struck by a vehicle which is not
included in the first party coverage category (a commercial vehicle,
for example). B then has none of the advantages of the no-fault plan
but is still subject to the restrictions on general damages. 50 Thus
the benefits available to some accident victims gave these victims a
privilege which was not available to all automobile accident victims.
At the same time, the restrictions on general damages applied to
all automobile accident victims. The court ruled that the Illinois
plan was arbitrary and unreasonable and constituted a special law
where a general one could be made applicable.
45. This memorandum opinion appears at 588 INS. L.J. 59 (1972) and 40 U.S.L.W. 2437
(1972),
46. Id. at 64.
47. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
48. Id. § 2.
49. Grace v. Howlett. 51 IlL. 2d 478, 487, 283 N._.2d 474, 479 (1972), citing Bridgewater
v. Hotz, 51 Ill. 2d 103, 281 N.E.2d 317 (1972).
50. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
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B. OTHER VIOLATIONS OF ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION
The special law prohibition constituted the primary basis for the
court's decision. However, the court also ruled that the mandatory
arbitration provision 51 of the Illinois plan did not meet the require-
ments of the Illinois Constitution. Under the Illinois plan, a party
could demand a trial de novo on issues of law and fact if dissatisfied
with the arbitration result. The court ruled that the procedure con-
stituted an appeal, in contravention of the Illinois constitutional pro-
hibition against trials de novo at the appellate level.
52
The court also stated that the provision of the statute requiring
the appellant to pay the costs of appeal would force the litigant to
pay the fees of the arbitrators. Such payment of fees is in violation
of the section of the Illinois Constitution which mandates that there
shall be no fee officers in the judicial system.53 Without elaborating
on the point, the court also declared that the arbitration section of
the Illinois plan violated the Illinois constitutional guarantee of a
trial by jury."
V. THE FLORIDA DECISION
The most recent constitutional test for no-fault occurred in July
of 1973 in the case of Kluger v. White. 55 In that case, the Supreme
Court of Florida held a portion of the Florida Automobile Repara-
tions Reform Act5" unconstitutional. The Florida no-fault statute
covered compensation for bodily injury and for property damage. The
section relating to property damage 57 was invalidated by the Florida
Supreme Court. The entire statute provided that all owners of motor
vehicles must purchase personal injury insurance or carry equiva-
lent security- which afforded a specific amount of coverage. The
coverage included recovery of expenses for medical care, income
loss, and funeral expenses, with the total amount of benefits payable
not to exceed $5000. For any economic loss in excess of the $5,000
limitation, the victim could bring an action against the negligent
party. The claimant could not recover damages for pain and suffer-
ing unless his actual medical expenses exceeded $1,000 or he suffered
an injury which caused (1) permanent disfigurement; (2) a fracture
of a weight bearing bone; (3) a compound, comminuted, displaced
51. ILL. STAT. §§ 1065.159 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973-74).
52. ILL. Co sTr. art. VI, § 9.
54. Id. art I, § 13.
55. Kluger v. White, Case No. 42,799 (Fla., filed July 11, 1973).
56. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.780-.741 (1972) covers personal injury protection and prop-
erty damage protection. The property damage section, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738 (1972),
was the portion invalidated.
57. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738 (1972).
5B. Id. § 627.733.
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or compressed fracture; (4) loss of body member; (5) permanent
injury or loss of a bodily function; or (6) death.
The portion of the statute relating to property protection did not
require vehicle owners to maintain property damage insurance on
their own vehicles. Insurers were required, however, to offer either
(1) full coverage, which provided insurance without regard to fault;
or (2) basic coverage, which was limited to insurance against dam-
ages caused by the fault of another. If the insured declined to pur-
chase either full or basic protection, he was in effect his own in-
surer for damage to his vehicle of $550 or less because the statute
provided for tort immunity for property damage up to $550.
The plaintiff in Kluger was the owner of an automobile that was
involved in a traffic accident with another vehicle. Plaintiff alleged
that the accident resulted from the negligence of the driver of the
other vehicle, and that damages to plaintiff's automobile totaled
$774.95. Plaintiff sought a judgment against Manchester Insurance
and Indemnity Company, from whom she had acquired an automobile
insurance policy that did not cover property damage to plaintiff's
automobile. Plaintiff had signed a statutorily required waiver form,
signifying that she waived her option to purchase full or basic pro-
perty damage protection.5 9 Plaintiff's claim that her insurance
company was liable for her losses was dismissed by the trail court.
Thereafter, plaintiff appealed to the Florida Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court ruling and held that the
property damage section of the Florida no-fault statute was un-
constitutional."
The Florida Supreme Court first noted that under the property
protection plan, the plaintiff had no recourse against anyone for a
loss resulting from the negligence of another driver. Plaintiff could
not recover from her own insurance company because she had de-
clined to purchase the full or basic coverage. Furthermore, she
59. 'luger v. White. Case No. 42, 799. (Fla., filed July 11, 1973 at 9, 10, n. 1 citing FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 627.738(1), (2) (1972). Rule 4-27.11 of the Rules promulgated and adopted
by the Insurance Commissioner on December 7, 1971, provides:
When an insurer issues a policy providing security under the Florida Automo-
bile Reparations Reform Act and such policy does not contain either collision
insurance or basic property protection, the insurer shall have secured from the
named insured a signed rejection form, which the insurer shall retain in Its
files.... The rejection form shall contain the following text:
"REJECTION OF BASIC PROPERTY PROTECTION AND COLLISION INSURANCE
The named insured acknowledges and agrees that (1) the Company has
offered to provide basic property protection coverage or collision insurance;
and (2) the named insured hereby rejects this offered coverage; and In
effecting this rejection, the named insured acknowledges and understands
that the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act may preclude recovery
from others for accidental property damage to the automobile.
Signed
Named Insured
60. Kluger v. White, Case No. 42,799 (Fla., filed July 11, 1973) at 2-3. The statutory
law is found at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738 (1972).
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could not recover in an action against the other driver because her
damages did not exceed the $550 threshold.6 1
The court's decision was based on its interpretation of Article I
of the Florida Constitution which states that:
The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any
injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial
or delay.82
Even though plaintiff raised numerous constitutional issues on appeal,
the court confined its discussion to the single issue of whether the
no-fault statute conflicted with this section of the Florida Constitu-
tion. The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that discussion of other
issues was made unnecessary by its ruling that the property pro-
tection plan failed to comply with the constitutional guarantee of a
redress for any injury.
After noting that the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Con-
stitution did apply to state government and to the legislature," the
court held that the Legislature of Florida was precluded from abolish-
ing a common law right unless the legislature (1) provided a "rea-
sonable alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State
to redress for injuries; ",64 or, (2) showed "an overpowering public
necessity for the abolishment of such right and no alternative
method of meeting such public necessity can be shown. '65 As an
example of a case in which "public necessity" justified the abolition
of a common law right, the court cited Rotwein v. Gersten."6
In this case, the Florida Supreme Court sanctioned the legislature's
abolition of causes of action for "alienation of affections, criminal
conversation, seduction or breach of contract to marry" because
these causes of action had become instruments of extortion and
blackmail. As an example of a "reasonable alternative" sufficient
to replace a right of action abolished by the legislature, the court
used the Workmen's Compensation analogy.
Turning to the legislation under consideration in the Kluger case,
the court ruled that the property protection plan did not fall into
either of the exceptions to the rule against abolition of the right
to redress for an injury. The court stated summarily that the legis-
61. Kuger v. White, Case No. 42,799 (Fla., filed July 11, 1973) at 4, citing BLASHFELD
AUTOMOBI. LAW AND PRACTICH § 480.1 (3rd ed. 1969) ; 25 C.J.S. Damages § 82' (1966). The
fair market value of plaintiff's car was only $250 and this was the measure of her dam-
ages.
62. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
63. Kluger v. White, Case No. 42,799 (Fla., filed July 11, 1973) at 5, citing Spafford v.
Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451 (1926). For a general discussion of the effect on
the legislature of such a constitutional provision see 16A C.J.S. Conastitutional Law § 710
(1966).
64. Kluger v. White, Case No. 42,799 (Fla., filed July 11, 1973) at 6.
65. Id.
66. Id., citing Rotweln v. Gersten, 160 Fla. 736, 36 So. 2d 419 (1948).
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lature had not shown sufficient necessity for the action it took, nor
had it provided an adequate substitute for the prior right.
VI. ANALYSIS OF KLUGER
The section of the Florida Constitution 67 upon which the Florida
Supreme Court based its holding in Kluger is derived from the
Magna Carta. 68 It is similar to provisions found in the United States
Constitution and many state constitutions.69 The Florida court inter-
preted this provision broadly and held that it barred the legislature
from abolishing a common-law cause of action except in cases of
public necessity or in the event that an adequate substitute was
provided. This interpretation is in contrast to the Massachusetts
court's interpretation in Pinnick of a similar provision in the Mass-
achusetts Constitution.70 The Massachusetts court held that the pro-
vision applied only to the protection of procedural rights. 1
Although the Florida court recognized two exceptions to its gen-
eral rule against legislative abolition of common law rights, the
court's narrow interpretation of these exceptions excluded the action
taken by the Florida legislature in enacting the property protection
plan. In dealing with the "reasonable alternative" exception, the
Kluger court was facing essentially the same question asked by the
Pinnick court in the context of due process-does the no-fault law
provide an adequate substitute for pre-existing rights? In Pinnick
the court found that the advantages of the no-fault system insured
that the exchange of rights was adequate. However, the Kluger
court stated "[n]or has alternative protection for the victim of the
accident been provided, as evidenced by the facts here before the
court. ' 72 This seems to imply that because a particular victim was
precluded from recovery, the no-fault law failed to provide an ade-
quate substitute for pre-existing rights. This holding was reached
even though the advantages of the no-fault system were available
to the victim had she chosen to avail herself of them. The Kluger
court reasoned that if the property damage coverage had been
mandatory, then a reasonable alternative to an action in tort would
have been provided. Justice Boyd, responding to this argument in
his dissenting opinion, pointed out that since the legislature could
have required the purchase of collision insurance, 3 it should also
67. FLA. CONST. art. I, j 21.
68. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1945). The provision in the Magna
Carta is worded: "We will sell to no man, we will not deny to any man, either justice
or right."
69. See, e.g., Payne v. Lee, 24 N.W.2d 259 .(Minn. 1946); Walters v. Blackledge, 71
So. 2d 483 (Miss. 1954). In North Dakota a similar provision appears In N.D. CONST. § 22.
For further discussion see 16A C.J.S., Constitutional Law § 708 (1956).
70. See MAss. CONST. pt. I, art. 11.
71. Cases cited note 28, supra.
72. Kluger v. White, Case No. 42,799 (Fla., filed July 11, 1973) at 7.
73. CI. Williams v. Newton, 236 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
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have the power to permit the owner to make the choice between
acquiring the coverage or being his own insurer for property damage
of less than $550.
In holding that the Florida property protection plan did not fit
into the "public necessity "exception, the court stated only that the
legislature had not shown the requisite public necessity. The dissent,
however, took note of the abuses of the automobile accident repara-
tions system in Florida and the burdens of investigation, trials, ap-
peals, legal fees, and delay that were imposed upon the accident
victim and stated that "[a] better system was not only needed, but
became mandatory.1
7 4
The Kluger court began its discussion of the constitutionality of
the Florida statute with a statement of the issues that included an
implicit assumption. The court framed the issue of the case as
being whether the legislature had the power to abolish an existing
remedy without providing alternative protection for the injured
party.75 By stating the issue in these terms, the court is making
the assumption that the no-fault statute does not provide an alter-
native for pre-existing rights. Presumably the court felt justified in
framing the issue in those terms because the particular plaintiff
before it had no redress at that point in time. After noting that the
Florida Constitution barred abolition of a common law right which
predated the Constitution, the court went on to discuss the two ex-
ceptions to this rule. The exceptions consisted of cases of public
necessity and instances where an adequate alternative had been pro-
vided. The court gave perfunctory consideration to the question of
whether the no-fault statute provided an adequate substitute for pre-
existing rights. This is not surprising in view of the basic premise
with which the court began.
The court's discussion of the unconstitutionality of the Florida
property protection plan was brief and the court failed to provide
the reasons for its conclusions. The court found that the statute,
unlike Workmen's Compensation, did not provide an adequate sub-
stitute for pre-existing rights. The court failed to explain, however,
why the alternative was inadequate or why the analogy to Workmen's
Compensation was inappropriate. The court further stated that the
legislature had not demonstrated the requisite public necessity for
the statute, but again did not give its reasoning.
CONCLUSION
The Grace and Kluger cases present a contrast in constitutional
74. Kluger v. White, Case No. 42,799 (Fla., filed July 11, 1973) (dissenting opinion) at
16.75. Kluger V. White. Case No. 42,799 (Fla., filed July 11, 1973) at 4.
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objections to no-fault. The court in Grace pointed to specific pro-
cedural defects in the Illinois plan, while the Kluger court objected
to the Florida no-fault statute on more basic constitutional grounds.
It would seem that the Illinois statute could be revised to cure the
constitutional infirmities found by the Grace court. At the same
time, it appears that the KIuger court is simply not prepared, to
accept a no-fault statute.
The Grace court's strongest objection to the Illinois plan was
that people who did not qualify for no-fault benefits were subject
to limitations on damages. A simple revision of the statute could
eliminate limitations on damages for those persons, thus obviating
this constitutional objection. As to the court's other findings, if the
appellate trial de novo feature is not susceptible of correction, the
arbitration feature could be stricken from the statute without sub-
stantial impairment of the effectiveness of the no-fault plan.
In contrast with the Grace decision, the Kluger court's bare
conclusions give the Florida legislature little assistance in correcting
the Florida property protection plan. The feature of the Florida
statute which the Kiuger court found to be in conflict with the
Florida Constitution was the provision that a person could elect to
be his own insurer for property damage of $550 or less to his own
vehicle. This aspect of the statute could be altered by requiring the
purchase of property insurance. But as the court stated, this would
create new constitutional questions. 76 The issue before the court
would then be whether such a requirement for all motorists was
reasonable..In view of the court's holding that no public necessity had
been shown for abolition of the "right to sue," it is doubtful that
the Florida court would find mandatory property protection reason-
able.
One constitutional issue remains unresolved by all three state
supreme court decisions. The problem centers on limiting damages
for pain and suffering by relating them to medical expenses. This
medical threshold approach to general damages" may be subject
to attack on equal protection grounds. 78 Although the lower court
in Grace found that this feature of no-fault was violative of the
equal protection clause, no state supreme court has reached this
issue. One possible solution to this equal protection objection would
76. Id. at 7.
77. The threshhold approach provides that general damages may not be recovered unless
actual medical expenses exceed a certain minimum. Another similar approach is the formula
method contained in the proposed North Dakota plan. Under this plan recovery for pain
and suffering would be limited to 50 cents on the dollar for the first $500 in medical bills
and $1 for every medical bill dollar over $500.
78. The argument was raised but not reached in Pinnick and Grace. It was not raised in
MKuger because the personal injury section of the statute was not before the court.
79. It is felt that some limitation on pain and suffering damages is necessary to reduce
inflated "nuisance" claims which drive up insurance rates.
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be a statutory schedule of injury compensation payments, similar
to Workmen's Compensation schemes. Since some sort of threshold
for pain and suffering claims is essential to no-fault plans gaining
wide acceptance,"9 proponents of no-fault must await the resolution
of this issue.
VIRGINIA POWELL

